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CASES NOTED
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION
AND GATHERING-FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION DENIED POWER
TO CONTROL TRANSFER OF GAS RESERVES
The Federal Power Commission brought suit for a preliminary injunc-
tion and temporary restraining order to prevent defendant from transferring
gas reserves pending the completion by the Commission of an investigation
authorized by the Natural Gas Act.' These gas reserves had been submitted
to the Commission as used and usable properties in connection with de-
fendant's application for certificate of convenience and necessity, 2 and for
approval of its schedule of rates.3 A temporary restraining order was issued
and has been kept alive by renewals, but after a hearing, a preliminary in-
junction was denied by the District Court on the ground that the Commission
had failed to show any justification for the relief asked. This judgment was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.4 Held, on certiorari, affirming
judgment of Circuit Court of Appeals, the transfer of undeveloped gas leases
is an activity related to the production and gathering of natural gas and beyond
the coverage of the Act and, therefore, the authority of the Commission cannot
reach the sales. Since the Commission cannot stop the proposed transfer it
should not be permitted to delay it by a temporary injunction. Federal Power
Comsnission v, Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company, 69 Sup. Ct. 1251
(1949).
The primary aim of the Natural Gas Act was to protect consumers against
exploitation at the hands of the natural gas companies. 5 To accomplish this
aim, Congress drew within its regulatory powers three things: (1) the trans-
portation of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale; (2) its sale in
interstate commerce for resale; and (3) natural gas companies engaged in
such transportation or sale.6 Basic procedure established by the Act required
that prospective interstate distributors and marketers of natural gas should
first obtain from the'Federal Power Commission a certificate of convenience
and necessity, and an approval of the proposed schedule of rates.7 The Com-
mission was required to issue certificates of convenience and necessity only
when an interstate company proved itself able and willing properly to perform
1. 52 STAT. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (b) (1938).
2. 52 STAT. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (c) (1938), as amended, 56 STAT. 83 (1942).
3. 52 STAT. 822, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1938).
4. Federal Power Commission v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 173 F.2d 57
(1949).
5. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ; Pan-
handle Eastern Pipe Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947).
6. Federal Power Comm'n v. Public Service Comm'n of Indiana, supra.
7. 52 STAT. 822, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1938).
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the service proposed and to conform to the provisions of the Act and the re-
quirements, rules, and regulations of the Commission.8 Rate schedules were
required to be approved on the basis of the most reasonable rate to the local
distributor consonant with a fair return to the interstate distributor.9 Upon
its own motion the Commission could investigate the operations of any com-
pany under its jurisdiction, could require the submission of complete records
of its purchasing contracts and lease holdings, and could require a reduction
in rates if such reduction were justified. 10 Not only was the Commission
authorized to require applicants for certificates to show the gas reserves
which it had available to supply the proposed market, but the Act specifically
prohibited a company from abandoning all or any portion of its facilities sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Commission without the prior approval of the
Commission. 1
In passing the Natural Gas Act, Congress did not contemplate using its
constitutional limit of power but intended only to take under federal control
that segment of the natural gas industry which the states were powerless to
regulate.' 2 Several phases of the industry's activities were specifically ex-
empted from federal control, but the decision in the instant case hinges upon
the interpretation of only one-- ". : . the production and gathering of
natural gas." A majority of the Supreme Court ruled that undeveloped gas
leases were an integral part of the "production and gathering" phase of the
natural gas industry and therefore subject in no way to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, Thus, it appears that the decision raises two points of interest
since (1) it appears to establish a new precedent for determining the meaning
of words used in acts of Congress, and (2) it renders an administrative
agency to which Congress has given certain responsibilities for the purpose
of accomplishing a specified purpose impotent to perform its assigned duties.
At no place in the Natural Gas Act does it specifically define undeveloped
gas leases as a part of "production and gathering" of natural gas. The courts
have ruled that there is a distinct difference between a lease and production.13
Oil and gas field terminology distinctly differentiates between leases and pro-
duction.' 4 Important gas and oil producing states control the drilling of oil
8. Ibid.
9. 52 STAT. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 717e (a) (1938); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, supra.
10. 52 SrAT. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 717e (1938).
11. Id. at § 717f (b).
12. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, supra; Federal Power
Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra.
13. Gas Ridge v. Suburban Agricultural Properties, 150 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1945)(lease effective so long as oil or gas was produced in paying quantities and terminated
when that failed); Cox v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App. 1944), 184 S.W.2d 323, 325, 327(lease effective for five years or so long thereafter as gas was used from the land, but in
absence of pipe line facilities and thus an available market no gas was produced as a
matter of law within the provision).
14. Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, supra; Gas Ridge v.
Suburban Agricultural Properties, supra.
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and gas wells, and the production of oil and gas, for conservation purposes,
but permit free trading in leases.' 5 The case referred to in the opinion in
the instant case as being a precedent for ruling that an undeveloped lease is a
part of "production and gathering" appears not to be directly in point since
that opinion merely stated that the phrase "production and gathering" com-
prehended the producing properties and gathering facilities of a natural gas
company.' Since an undeveloped lease is not a producing property nor a
gathering facility it is not directly covered in the opinion. Prior to the instant
case it would seem to be beyond dispute that an undeveloped gas lease was
neither a producing property nor a gathering facility. It seems clear that, in
arriving at the conclusion that the "clear and natural" meaning of the terms
"production and gathering" included undeveloped gas leases was arrived at
by giving great weight to debates in Congress.1 7 Thus, debates in Congress
are-used to determine the meaning of words used in acts of Congress contrary
to the well established rule of law. 18
Not only does the opinion apparently overrule the above previously well
established rule of law sub silentio, but it seems that the Court can no longer
be depended upon to broadly interpret an Act of Congress so that the ad-
ministrative agency designated by the act shall have such powers as are es-
sential to the accomplishment of the expressed purpose of Congress. 9 In the
instant case, the defendant had listed the undeveloped gas leases in question as
part of its used and usable properties. Sufficient gas reserves are an im-
portant element in qualifying for the required certificate.20 The reserves in
question may have been the deciding factor in the Commission's decision to
grant the certificate. It appears that these reserves were therefore dedicated
to the public use in accordance with the application for the certificate. The
Commission also made allowance for lease rentals on these reserves in ap-
proving the schedule of rates.2 1 Depriving the Commission of power to regu-
late the transfer of dedicated gas reserves permits an approved distributor to
realize a profit out of the gas in these dedicated reserves without regard to
the rate schedule approved by the Commission.22 The distributor can also
15. Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937); Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Landon, 249 U.S. 236 (1919).
16. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, supra.
17. See footnotes in report of instant case.
18. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 650 (1931) (while
the general rule precludes the use of these [Congressionall debates to explain the
meaning of words of the statutes, they may be considered as reflecting light upon its
general purposes and the evils which it sought to remedy).
19. See Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, supra; United States
V. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67, 70 (5th Cir. 1932) ; Moffatt Tunnell Improvement District v.
Denver & S.L. Ry., 45 F.2d 715, 723 (10th Cir. 1930), cert. denied 283 U.S. 837 (1931).
20. 52 STAT. 824, 15 U.S.C. § 717f (b) (3) (1938); 15 U.S.C. § 717f (c), as
amended, 56 STAT. 83 (1942).
21. Docket No. G-217, F.P.C. Docket G-200 and G-207 decided Sept. 23, 1942.
22. In the instant case the gas company has transferred gas reserves which it has
used in obtaining an approval of rates to a subsidiary corporation which will, or has
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abandon facilities at will and without regard to prior approval of the Com-
mission.2 3 Thus the consuming public is left a prey to exploitation at the
hands of the interstate distributors of natural gas in spite of the expressed
intention of Congress to prevent that exploitation, and the designated ad-
ministrative agency is rendered powerless to perform its assigned duties.
The power to cure the defect thus made apparent seems to rest with
Congress.
ADMIRALTY-MAINTENANCE AND CURE
Libelant, a member of the Merchant Marine, was injured while overleave
and returning to his ship. After being treated in various hospitals he was
discharged as completely disabled. He was totally and permanently blind, and
from time to time would require some medical care to ease attacks of head-
aches and epileptic convulsions. Petitioner contended that he was entitled to
maintenance and cure as long as he was disabled, which in this case would
be for life. The Court of Appeals awarded him maintenance and cure for a
six month period after he was discharged from the hospital. Held, on certiorari,
he was not entitled to a lump sum payment, but the court intimated that he
could recover in future suits for any disbursements for further medical treat-
ments found necessary. Farrell v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 707 (1949)
(four Justices dissenting).
The duty of the owner of a vessel to provide maintenance I and cure 2
for seamen injured or becoming ill while in the service of the ship has been
recognized by most maritime nations as an implied part of the contract of
employment.3 To saddle the owner with the expense of maintenance and cure
the seaman need only show that the injury or illness was incurred while in
the service of the ship, 4 even though the effects thereof do not become evident
contracted to, sell its production for fifteen years through an intrastate distributor
which would be outside the jurisdiction of the Commission. Under this decision there
remains nothing to prevent defendant from doing the same thing with any or all of its
reserves which lie entirely within any given state.
23. If defendant can dispose of its reserves of gas at will as permitted under this
decision it can render itself void of any natural gas to send through its pipeline facilities.
If it has no gas, and cannot buy gas for its interstate distributing system at a rate
approved by the Commission, then its pipe lines are abandoned in fact without the
Commission's approval.
1. "Maintenance is food and lodging at the expense of the ship." The Bouker No.
2, 241 Fed. 831, 835 (2d Cir. 1917).
2. "Cure is used in its original meaning of taking charge of, or care of the disabled
seaman, and not in that of a positive cure which may be impossible." The Atlantic, 2
Fed. Cas. No. 620, at 131 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1849).
3. The Atlantic, supra at 130; THE LAWS OF OLEROrN Art. VI, VII, 30 Fed. Cas.
1174; THE LAws or Wlssuav, Art, XVIII, XIX, 30 Fed. Cas. 1191; THE LAWS OF
THE HANsE TowNs, Art. XXXIX, XLV, 30 Fed. Cas. 1200; THE MARINE ORtDNAN E
OF Louts XIV, Title Fourth, Art. XI, 30 Fed. Cas. 1209.
4. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943); Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed.
Cas. 480, No. 6,047 (C.D.D. Me. 1823) ; Cordes v. Weyerhaeuer S.S. Co., 75 F.
Supp. 537 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
